Mathew 5:32 states:
'Every one who divorces his wife, except for the cause of unchastity, makes her
commit adultery; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.' If
with Erasmus we suppose that 'divorce' here means 'the complete dissolution of
the marriage', the logic of this statement seems defective or at least unfair.
For on this understanding Mathew 5:32a means that divorce with the right to
remarry is only valid if the wife commits the particular sin of adultery. Yet in other situations that result in
divorce neither party can remarry as the unconditional statement of Mathew
5:32b declares. Now if the sin of
adultery results in the complete dissolution of the marriage, that allows both
parties, the adulterous wife and the innocent husband, to remarry! Dupont regards it as 'manifestly absurd' to
allow a woman divorced for adultery to remarry, but to deny this right to a
woman divorced for another reason.
This absurdity may
be alleviated, as Dupont suggests, if one supposes that the divorced adulteress
is refused the right of remarriage, but the innocent husband may remarry
(=Erasmian view). But this is effectively to allow polygamy! For if the woman cannot remarry she is not
technically divorced, but separated. The marriage bond with her husband still exists: that is why remarrying a
divorced woman is adultery (5:32b). Thus
her former husband is really becoming a bigamist if he takes a second wife
since the marital bond with his former spouse has not been dissolved. The early church view, in contrast, leads to
no such contradiction. In no case is
there the right of remarriage. Immorality may justify separation but not
remarriage: in every case remarriage involves adultery.
William A. Heath and Gordan Wenham
From their book "Jesus And Divorce: The Problem of the Evangelical Consensus"
No comments:
Post a Comment